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THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST?:
CANADIAN LAW SCHOOL
ADMISSIONS©
BY DAWNA TONG* AND W. WESLEY PUE**
This article assesses the admissions policies commonly
employed by law faculties in common law Canada.
These faculties rely heavily on admissions criteria and
policies developed in the United States and, like their
American counterparts, typically admit students on the
basis of “index scores” produced by combining Law
School Admissions Test (LSAT) performance with
Undergraduate Grade Point Average (UGPA). The
appropriateness of this American model to the
Canadian context has never been rigorously assessed.
This raises serious questions as to whether Canadian
law school admissions policies serve either of their
stated goals of finding the “best” students or of
advancing social equity. The authors summarize
available data and identify a number of problems that
flow from reliance on index scores as the primary basis
for admissions decisions. Particular problems addressed
include the inadequacy of the methods used to identify
either good students or good lawyers, the trickle-on
consequences for law school pedagogy and evaluation,
and wider consequences for distributive justice. In light
of the immense impact of law school admissions
decisions on individual career choice, the composition
of the legal profession, and Canadian social mobility
patterns, the authors call for a re-evaluation of the
assumptions and practices of law school admissions.
Cet article évalue les politiques d’admission
communément utilisées par les facultés de common law
au Canada. Ces facultés de droit se fient sur des
politiques et critères d’admission développés aux États-
Unis et, comme leurs facultés homologues américaines,
acceptent les étudiants sur la base d’un score calculé en
combinant le résultat au test d’aptitude pour l’étude du
droit (LSAT) et la moyenne cumulative obtenue aux
études du premier cycle. La justesse du modèle
américain dans le contexte canadien n’a jamais été
évalué de façon rigoureuse. Ceci soulève de sérieuses
questions à savoir si les politiques d’admission aux
facultés de droit canadiennes accomplissent l’un ou
l’autre de leurs objectifs: soit celui de trouver les
“meilleurs” étudiants, ou de promouvoir l’équité
sociale. Les auteurs résument des données existantes et
identifient de nombreux problèmes qui découlent de
cette dépendance sur de tels scores comme source
primaire des décisions d’admission. L’insuffisance des
méthodes utilisées pour identifier soit de bons
étudiants ou de bons avocats, les conséquences qu’une
telle méthode peut avoir dans le contexte de la
pédagogie et de l’évaluation de l’éducation juridique,
ainsi que les conséquences pour la justice distributive
de façon générale sont des problèmes qui sont abordés
de façon particulière par les auteurs. Comme la
décision d’être admis ou non à une faculté de droit peut
avoir un impact énorme sur le choix individuel de
carrière, la composition de la profession juridique et les
tendances de mobilité sociale au Canada, les auteurs
revendiquent une réevaluation des suppositions et
pratiques utilisées lors des admissions aux écoles de
droit.
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I.  INTRODUCTION: A LAW SCHOOL
OPEN TO ALL THE TALENTS
Most Canadians would agree that a law school should “be open
… to all the talents, open to all the views … .”1 It is this principle that
ensured that Canada’s first modern law faculty welcomed students of
ability without explicit barriers regarding class, ethnicity, or gender when
it opened its doors in 1945—a time when class, race, and gender
commonly defined identity and career options alike.2
The goal of selecting and promoting the best and the brightest
seems worthy, particularly in contrast to the explicitly discriminatory
policies of the not-so-distant past. Attaining this seemingly simple goal
has, however, proved to be a complex matter.
1 Interview with Founding Dean, University of British Columbia Law Faculty, G. Curtis (17
January 1995).
2 Ibid.
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For the better part of fifty years, the composition of the legal
profession in common law Canada has largely been determined by the
decisions of admissions committees at university law faculties. Their
decisions, made in private, rarely studied, and never subjected to
sustained critical enquiry, have immense importance for law schools, for
the legal profession, and also for society at large. Students admitted to
law school rarely fail. As a result, the composition of Canada’s legal
profession is determined first, and most significantly, by the decisions of
law school admissions committees.3
This matters for several reasons. First, despite ongoing
transformations, trials, and tribulations, the legal profession remains
privileged.4 Call to the bar certifies “middle class respectability.” The
law still provides a reasonable (often very good) income for most law
graduates most of the time.5 Law school admissions decisions clearly
have a profound effect on the life opportunities of individuals. The
cumulative result of admissions decisions modestly affects overall
3 This is despite a surprisingly high rate of “drop-out” from the profession, particularly among
women and members of visible minorities: see J. Brockman, Encountering Barriers and/or Moving
On: A Survey of Former Members of the Law Society of British Columbia (Vancouver: Law Society of
British Columbia, 1991) [hereinafter Encountering Barriers]; J. Brockman, Identifying the Issues: A
Survey of Active Members of the Law Society of Alberta (Edmonton: Law Society of Alberta, 1992)
[hereinafter Identifying the Issues]; J. Brockman, Leaving the Practice of Law: A Survey of Non-
Practising Members of the Law Society of Alberta (Edmonton: Law Society of Alberta, 1992)
[hereinafter Leaving the Practice of Law]; F.M. Kay, Transitions in the Ontario Legal Profession: A
Survey of Lawyers Called to the Bar Between 1975 and 1990 (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada,
1991) [hereinafter Transitions in the Ontario Legal Profession]; F.M. Kay, Barriers and Opportunities
Within Law: Women in a Changing Legal Profession (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 1996)
[hereinafter Barriers and Opportunities]; J. Hagan & F.M. Kay, Gender in Practice: A Study of
Lawyers’ Lives (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); C. Menkel-Meadow, “Feminization of
the Legal Profession: The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers” in R.L. Abel & P.S. Lewis,
eds., Lawyers in Society: Comparative Theories (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) 196;
and Canadian Bar Association, Touchstones for Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability:
Report of the Canadian Bar Association Task Force on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession
(Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1993) (Chair: B. Wilson) [hereinafter Touchstones for Change].
See also J. Brockman & D.E. Chunn, eds., Investigating Gender Bias: Law, Courts and the Legal
Profession (Toronto: Thompson Educational, 1993) (research of gender bias in the profession); and
M. Thornton, Dissonance and Distrust: Women in the Legal Profession (Melbourne: Oxford
University Press, 1996) (experiences of women in the legal profession in Australia).  
4 See H.W. Arthurs, “Lawyering in Canada in the 21st Century” (1996) 15 Windsor Y.B.
Access Just. 202 [hereinafter “Lawyering in Canada”]; and H.W. Arthurs “The Political Economy of
Canadian Legal Education” (1998) 25 J. L. & Soc. 14 [hereinafter “Canadian Legal Education”].
5 See, for example, D.A.A. Stager & H.W. Arthurs, Lawyers in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1990); and D.A.A. Stager & D.K. Foot, Lawyers’ Earnings Under Market
Differentiation and Rapid Supply Expansion, 1970-1980 (Toronto: University of Toronto,
Department of Economics, 1987).
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patterns of social mobility (or rigidity of class structure and hierarchy) in
Canada.
More importantly, however, the constitution of the legal
profession impacts on public discourse, public policy, and law. “The
law,” one distinguished scholar observed nearly a century ago, is nothing
more than what “the consensus of legal opinion in the community
believes it to be, first the judges, next the lawyers, and finally the mass of
intelligent laymen who direct the organized activities of the state.”6
Lawyers are the most privileged speakers of legal discourse. Their
innumerable local choices affect what rights are asserted in which fora,
how rights-claims are translated into the “normative language of state,”7
which claims are pursued in litigation and, ultimately, how judge-made
law develops.8
Lawyers also play crucial roles as “lobbyists.” In this capacity,
they perform just off centre stage in policy formation at all levels—from
school boards through municipal councils to parliamentary committees
and in the legislature itself. Here too, it matters profoundly who lawyers
are, what values they hold, how they understand—from their own
background, identity, and social location—the circumstances individuals
confront, and how they choose to refract issues and concerns into public
discourse. The cumulative effect of lawyerly interventions in public life
in this way is immense. For such reasons, amongst others, the public
interest requires a legal profession that is both “competent” and
“diverse.” A profession consisting entirely of extremely “competent,”
hard-working, selfless, and ethical individuals who were all, nonetheless,
exclusively drawn from a narrow social group would not be well placed
6 I.A. MacKay, “The Education of a Lawyer” (Address, Third Annual Meeting of the Law
Society of Alberta, December 1913), reproduced in (1940-1942) Alta. L. Q. 103 at 108.
7 See M. Cain, “The General Practice Lawyer and the Client: Towards a Radical Conception”
(1979) 7 Int’l J. Soc. & L. 331, where she describes lawyers, at 335, as “conceptive ideologists who
think, and therefore constitute the form of, the emergent relations of capitalist society.” Cain sees
lawyers as “both agents of the bourgeoisie and translators” and “creators of the language into which
they translate”: ibid. See also M. Cain, “The Symbol Traders” in M. Cain & C.B. Harrington, eds.,
Lawyers in a Postmodern World: Translation and Transgression (Buckingham, U.K.: Open University
Press, 1994) 15; M.S. Larson, “Depoliticization and Lawyers’ Functions: Reflections for a
Comparative Analysis” (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall L.J. 743; and M.S. Larson, “The Changing
Functions of Lawyers in the Liberal State:  Reflections for Comparative Analysis” in Abel & Lewis,
eds., supra note 3, 427.
8 For discussions of the ways in which personal identity intersects with lawyerly functions, see
W.W. Pue, “Lawyering for a Fragmented World: Professionalism After God” (1998) 5 Int’l J. L.
Prof. 125; and S. Goldman & A. Sarat, eds., American Court Systems: Readings in Judicial Process
and Behaviours (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1978).
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to serve the public interest.9  It could understand nothing beyond its own
narrow sectoral interests. The foundation of liberal democracy lies not in
the denial of diversity but in finding creative ways of negotiating
difference so as to make life-in-common possible, tolerable, and just.
II.  OVERVIEW OF CANADIAN LAW
SCHOOL ADMISSIONS POLICIES10
Well aware of these sorts of considerations, Canadian law
schools have long laboured mightily to ensure that admissions do not
degenerate into reliance on “old boy” referrals, “know-who” admissions,
or other forms of “small c” corruption. Generally, the policies currently
in place and the spirit motivating them are directed towards translating
the desire to be open “to all the talents” into reality. The primary
method relied upon in pursuit of this goal has, for historical reasons,
been the development of an all-but-exclusive reliance on “objective”
admissions criteria. Recognizing that “one size” does not fit all, however,
law faculties commonly run three admissions categories simultaneously.
9 Thornton, supra note 3 at 2, refers to the “benchmark man” in the legal profession as the
normative standard to which others are compared. According to Thornton, he is “White,
heterosexual, able-bodied, politically conservative, and middle class.” For discussions relating to
identity and lawyering in the public interest, see the articles collected in (1998) 5 Int’l J. L. Prof. See
also S. Harding, ed., Feminism and Methodology: Social Science Issues (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana
University Press, 1987) (arguing that there is a uniquely “feminist” standpoint on many issues).
Critical race theory challenges the law and legal language for speaking in one “universal” or
monolithic voice that falsely presents itself as objective and neutral.
The organized legal professions of Canada have dedicated considerable time, effort, and
money to studying barriers to access to the profession: see, for example, Canadian Bar Association,
The Challenge of Racial Equality: Putting Principles into Practice (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association,
1999) (Co-chairs: J. St. Lewis & B. Trevino) [hereinafter Challenge of Racial Equality]; Canadian
Bar Association, Virtual Justice: Systemic Racism and the Canadian Legal Profession (Ottawa:
Canadian Bar Association, 1999) (Co-chairs: J. St. Lewis & B. Trevino) [hereinafter Virtual Justice];
Law Society of British Columbia, Summary of the Discussion of the Aboriginal Law Graduates Focus
Groups (Vancouver: Law Society of British Columbia, 1998) [hereinafter Aboriginal Law Graduates
Focus Groups]; Law Society of British Columbia, Report on the Survey of Aboriginal Law Graduates
in British Columbia (Vancouver: Law Society of British Columbia, 1996) [hereinafter Report on the
Survey of Aboriginal Law Graduates in British Columbia]; Touchstones for Change, supra note 3;
Canada, Department of Justice, Survey of Students at Ten Law Schools in Canada, by C. Meredith &
C. Paquette (Ottawa: Research and Development Directorate, 1992); and Law Society of Upper
Canada, Survey of Black Law Students, Black Articling Students, and Recently Called Black Lawyers,
by A.E. Spears (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 1992) [hereinafter Survey of Black Law
Students].
10 Because education in the civil law is distinctive, we confine our remarks to admissions
policies at common law faculties in Canada.
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At most faculties, a “regular” category prevails and the majority
of admissions decisions are made strictly on the basis of statistical
manipulations of “objective” data. Almost all students admitted in this
way will have completed a bachelor’s level degree and all are required to
take the United States Law School Admissions Council’s standardized
test, the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT).11 Students are typically
ranked on some form of a combined Undergraduate Grade Point
Average (UGPA)/LSAT score. The University of British Columbia
Calendar statement regarding admissions to the LL.B. program is
representative:
To be eligible for consideration in the Regular category an applicant must:
•have obtained an undergraduate degree in an approved course of studies from an
approved university; or
•have completed three years (90 credits) in an approved course of studies leading to an
undergraduate degree at an approved university; or
•have completed two years (60 credits) in an approved course of studies leading to an
undergraduate degree at an approved university and, at the time of application, be
enrolled in the third year of studies of a degree program, so that 90 credit hours will be
completed by June.12
For applicants in the Regular category at the University of
British Columbia, admission depends on the index number obtained by
combining the applicant’s academic average and LSAT score, weighting
each equally (50 per cent GPA and 50 per cent LSAT).13 In calculating the
academic average, the Faculty uses all undergraduate courses taken for
credit prior to the applicant’s first undergraduate degree that are
completed in the previous academic year. The academic average of
applicants who, at the time of application, are still completing their last
year of studies will be calculated to ensure maintenance of the average
achieved over the first two years of study.
All disciplines are given equal weight, but grades obtained in
performance courses may be excluded from the calculation of the
academic average. Similarly, in special circumstances, applicants may
request exclusion of particular grades or an LSAT score from
11 Less than 10 per cent of first-year LL.B. students at the University of British Columbia, for
example, are admitted without degrees in hand.
12 University of British Columbia, Faculty of Law Calendar, 1998-2000 (Vancouver: University
of British Columbia, 1998) at 58 [hereinafter UBC Faculty of Law Calendar].
13 Further information on the LSAT is available: see online: The Law School Admission
Council <http://www.lsac.org> (date accessed: 26 February 2000).
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computation. Special circumstances consist of medical or compassionate
grounds of a temporary nature.
In 1996-1997, the median applicant in the Regular category had
an academic average of approximately 79 per cent and an LSAT score of
161 (83rd percentile).
Though it would be too crude to suggest that numbers fed into a
computer spit out admissions decisions uninterrupted by human
thought, the image captures an aspect of reality just as caricature
suggests portrait. While Canadian law faculties tend not to favour
graduates of one university or one particular undergraduate program
over another, a 1996 study revealed that one Canadian law school
prefers applicants who had attended a “major” Canadian university
(UGPAs from these universities were valued more highly than from other
“less prestigious” universities) and who had taken undergraduate
programs thought to be rigorous (engineering preferred over education,
for example).14 Some law schools are rumoured to target recruitment
efforts on elite private high schools (i.e., targeting students three to four
years before they are even eligible to apply to law faculties), but such
selective recruiting efforts, if they exist, are not part of formal
admissions policy.
In addition to a regular admissions category, most law schools
have some form of “special access” and “First Nations” categories. In
such “alternate” streams, admission is determined by UGPA and LSAT,
combined with some consideration of non-numerical criteria, such as
work experience, community involvement, family circumstances,
membership in a group under-represented in the legal profession, and so
forth. The range of relevant criteria that schools or admissions
committees might wish to consider from year to year is potentially
limitless. Applicants are typically asked to self-declare the category they
wish to be considered under and to provide evidence that they “fit.” The
purpose of these “alternate” streams is to seek out “excellence” in cases
where it is obscured by so-called objective criteria. Law school
gossip—especially amongst students—sometimes uncharitably presents
these categories as the preserve of a motley crew of the unfit: a back
door open to the “unqualified underprivileged” and “burnt-out police
officers.” Though no reliable data exists about decisionmaking in these
categories, the temptation for admissions committees to view them as
imperfect images of the “regular” stream is strong. Special admissions
14 See D. Tong, Gatekeeping in Canadian Law Schools: A History of Exclusion, the Rule of
“Merit,” and a Challenge to Contemporary Practices (LL.M. Thesis, University of British Columbia,
1996) at 35-37, 85-87 [unpublished].
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processes often focus as much on UGPA and LSAT scores (albeit at lower
levels) as is the case in the regular category.15
A few Canadian law faculties operate outside of the mainstream
by extending the logic of alternate admissions streams to their entire
admissions process. These faculties engage in extensive review of wide-
ranging criteria, including work experience, marital status, cultural
background, and community service, amongst other things, for all of
their admissions decisions. The expressed intent is always to seek out
“qualified” candidates who do not do well by standardized criteria and
to increase, not limit, “diversity” within the student body.16
III.  IDENTIFYING THE BEST?
Dawna Tong’s previous study17 addressed issues relating to
special access programs (called “affirmative action” programs south of
the border) in existence at Canadian law faculties in the 1990s. One
significant problem associated with such admissions streams is the
common perception—often shared even by the faculty and staff who
administer them—that the programs are in some way illegitimate. Many
individuals who establish, revise, and implement admissions policies
affecting “special access” students have internalized the view that these
policies are a sort of unpleasant, albeit necessary, compromise: impeding
rather than enhancing the university law faculty’s true mission of
selecting the “best qualified” students for entry to an ancient and
learned profession. Alternative admissions streams, in a nutshell, are
often thought to erode “quality.”18
15 Dawna Tong revealed that in the special access and First Nations admission categories
there was still an overwhelming emphasis on traditional criteria such as UGPA and LSAT in
admissions decisions at some Canadian law schools; minimum UGPA and LSAT scores were used in
these categories: see ibid. at 64-70, 78-82. Non-numerical criteria such as work experience,
community service, membership in a group under- or unrepresented in the legal profession would
only be considered once UGPA and LSAT scores reached very high levels: see ibid. at 53-55. At some
schools non-numerical criteria were considered in admissions decisions only for a small number of
applicants such as “borderline” cases: see ibid. at 52-53.
16 See Tong, supra note 14. See also the study of the Windsor Faculty of Law by D. Blonde et
al., “The Impact of Law School Admission Criteria: Evaluating the Broad-Based Admission Policy
at the University of Windsor Faculty of Law” (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 529.
17 Supra note 14.
18 It bears emphasis that this perception is quite contrary to the expressed goal of such
programs, which explicitly aim to compensate for non-random distortions of both UGPA and LSAT
results.
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Such views are common outside of the university as well. The
recent renunciation of “affirmative action” admissions programs in the
United States and the ideology informing it has cross-border effects. In
the only published survey of Canadian legal education, Maclean’s
magazine (“Canada’s National Magazine”) included information on the
average UGPA and LSAT scores of students admitted to law schools across
the country. From context and presentation the implication was clear:
Maclean’s was promoting the view that higher scores indicated a higher
quality student body, a better institution, and a superior legal
education.19 The assumption that alternative admissions streams are
essentially about “racial preferences” and that they are fundamentally
incompatible with (rather than integral to) the pursuit of “educational
excellence” is widely disseminated in popular media.20
Although Tong’s previous research focused centrally on
“alternate” admissions streams, one of its most interesting findings was
in relation to the mainstream admissions to Canadian law faculties. In
broad terms, it revealed a consensus amongst Canadian legal educators
that law school admissions policy should promote three interrelated
goals: (1) ensuring that admitted applicants have a reasonable chance of
succeeding at law school; (2) selecting students who will contribute
positively to Canadian society as lawyers or in other law-related
capacities following graduation; and (3) ensuring a non-discriminatory
admissions process reflective of Canadian universities’ commitment to
advancing “equity.”
This last point is important. The Queen’s Law School calendar,
for example, contains a policy statement respecting non-discrimination:
“no applicant will be denied admission to any program on the basis of
age, ancestry, colour, creed, marital status, place of origin, race or sex.”21
19 See A.D. Johnston, “Judging Canadian Law Schools: An Exclusive Report on the Best and
the Worst” Maclean’s (6 October 1997) 13. See also L.F. Wightman, “The Threat to Diversity in
Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in
Law School Admission Decisions” (1997) 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1. Through an examination of
admissions data, graduation rates, and bar passage rates, Wightman sought to examine the
consequences that exclusive reliance on numerical criteria would have on law school admissions
decisions. She found that this would result in a decline in racial and ethnic minority admissions.
Furthermore, when Wightman compared graduation rates and bar passage rates between minority
students who would have been accepted to law school and those who would not, Wightman found
no significant difference.
20 The quotations are taken from an editorial titled “Affirmatively Wrong” The National Post
(22 March 1999) A19.
21 Queen’s University, Faculty of Law Calendar, 1996-1997 (Kingston: Queen’s University,
1996) at 13.
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The University of British Columbia’s law calendar also indicates a
commitment to equity and diversity. It states:
The Faculty has a student body which increasingly reflects the geographical and cultural
diversity of Canadian society. Up to half the student body is drawn from outside British
Columbia and includes representatives from many First Nations communities and from
numerous other ethnic and racial minorities. Women and men are roughly equal in
number and there is a wide range of age groups.22
Similarly, the University of Toronto’s Law Faculty states that
“[t]he law school is enriched and Canadian society is benefited by a
diverse student body made up of students from various ethnic, racial and
cultural backgrounds, from different regions of Canada, as well as from
a range of academic disciplines, careers, and community and
extracurricular experiences.”23 The rhetorical commitment to equity is
clear. However, the nagging concern that “equity” stands opposed to
“quality” is never far from the surface—the comparator of the “regular”
admissions category always being near to mind. Curiously, however,
given its tremendous power as the norm against which all else is measured,
the “regular admissions” track itself has never been subjected to serious
scrutiny of the sort one might expect. Although weighted LSAT/UGPA
scores have been the foundation of law school admissions policies in
common law Canada for three decades, there has never been a review of
the adequacy and appropriateness of this “gatekeeping” technique
starting from first principles. 24 The “mainstream” itself turns out to exist
almost entirely as an article of faith, a matter of convenience.
The absence of any such study is surprising. During the course of
nearly two decades as a law teacher, one of us has repeatedly heard
second-hand accounts of studies of admissions policies conducted at one
or another Canadian law faculty (such is the impoverished world of our
professional gossip). There is even the odd published article making
oblique reference to such studies.25
22 UBC Faculty of Law Calendar, supra note 12 at 58.
23 University of Toronto, Faculty of Law Calendar, 1996-1997 (Toronto: University of
Toronto, 1996) at 62.
24 According to Arthur Braid and Cameron Harvey of the University of Manitoba Faculty of
Law, the University of Manitoba was the first law school in Canada to include the LSAT score in their
admissions criteria in 1968: interview with A. Braid and C. Harvey (2 October 1998).
25 See D. Olsen, The State Elite (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1980) at 44, where Olsen
refers to a study entitled “Who, What, From Where? A Report on the Average Osgoode Student”
Obiter Dicta (28 August 1972) 8. This survey, conducted by Martin Levy, asked first-year law
students about their personal background, and attitudes and opinions about the legal profession.
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It turns out, however, that such work, when done at all, is often
undertaken for administrative reasons and under the ambit of
admissions committees rather than as “research.” Some important
consequences flow from this. First, “administrative reports” are rarely
based on the kind of methodological rigour and conceptual clarity that
research demands. Second, research is put out to public consideration to
be read, interpreted, and evaluated by the scholarly community at large.
In striking contrast, the results of internal administrative studies are
almost never shared between schools, rarely revealed beyond the
originating faculty. Consequently, the administrative reports that have
been created over the years have entered popular consciousness
(amongst law teachers, at least) without ever having been subjected to
critical scrutiny from without the administrative or conceptual “frame”
that generated them. They enter the knowledge base of law teachers, law
students, and the wider community through gossip networks and second-
or third-hand summaries, rather than through formal review and
dissemination of results. There are no controls for methodological
rigour, no possibility of aggregating data over time or across faculties,
and no comparative analyses.
In our first approach to this article, we had hoped to review such
studies globally to provide a preliminary critique of the methodology and
findings of such on-the-ground research. This, we assume, is a necessary
first step in working towards some overall conclusion. Astonishingly,
given that so much turns on it, the work that would have grounded an
analysis of this sort may have never been undertaken in Canada. If it has
been done, it is not now available for critical scrutiny.
Much to our surprise, no Canadian law dean (Windsor and
Manitoba apart—see Part V, below) was able to provide us with any
internal assessment of admissions policy whatsoever. Two separate mail
surveys (conducted on 19 March 1996, and 19 March 1997) did not turn
up a single in-house study of admissions policy. The reason is not, as
cynics might suspect, a lack of candour or fear of what our research
might reveal. Most Canadian law deans in fact expressed their wish to
help us with our inquiry and their desire to see just such research done.
There have, in fact, been far fewer assessments of law school admissions
policy—however informally completed—than rumour had implied.
Sadly, some completed studies seem not to have survived the shredders
long enough to find a place in either scholarly literature or university
archives.
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IV.  SURVEY OF CANADIAN LAW DEANS
We did take some trouble to ensure that we obtained the best
available data from across common law Canada. Our first step was a
mail survey sent to all Canadian common law and civil law schools in
March 1996. In each case, letters were addressed to the dean of the
faculty and there were numerous follow-up contacts by way of letter,
phone call, and e-mail in order to ensure that we obtained all available
data. This survey requested information regarding any existing internal
studies of the regular admissions category, affirmative action, special
access, or discretionary admissions policies. We also requested
information concerning follow-up studies or reports analyzing the
success of support programs for alternative admissions stream students.
All common law schools except the Université de Moncton responded.26
Of the sixteen common law faculties (Victoria, British Columbia,
Calgary, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Windsor, Western Ontario,
York, Toronto, Queen’s, Ottawa, McGill, Moncton, New Brunswick,
and Dalhousie) only the University of Manitoba and the University of
Windsor reported having conducted internal studies assessing the
efficacy of their admissions policies. The University of Manitoba’s
research was undertaken by Barry Browning, then Registrar of the
University, drawing on student data from the 1970s. More recently,
researchers at the University of Windsor have published the results of a
major “quasi-longitudinal study of the Law School admission, education
and post-graduation experience.”27 The Windsor team is also in the final
stages of preparing a report in collaboration with colleagues at four
other Canadian law schools.28
For two reasons, it seemed unlikely to us that this could be the
sum total of Canadian research on the efficacy of law school admissions
policies in the three decades since the University of Manitoba first
adopted the LSAT as a central part of its admissions processes. First, a
great deal turns on these policies, at least for law faculties and their
prospective students. Second, because Canada’s universities pride
themselves on being committed to rational, not faith-based
26 Canada’s civil law schools operate in a significantly different educational and professional
environment and only the Université de Laval replied from the civil law side—where our questions
were mostly irrelevant.
27 Blonde et al., supra note 16 at 536.
28 See Selecting and Educating Lawyers for a Changing Society: A Comparative Study of
Admissions, Law School Environments and Careers of Law Graduates [forthcoming].
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decisionmaking, it seems counter-intuitive to think that major decisions
such as these might be unsupported by research and ongoing evaluation.
An abundance of caution led us to conduct another full mail survey in
1997. Fearing that our previous inquiries may have been insufficiently
clear, we asked law deans now whether their faculties had ever
“subjected the existing LL.B. admission standards to systematic study.”
More specifically, we asked “whether the use of Grade Point Averages,
scores in the Law School Admissions Test, the weighting of each of
these, and any other applicable admissions criteria have ever been
evaluated against any criteria of effectiveness.” Our letter requested
information regarding “in house” empirical or longitudinal studies
evaluating the appropriateness of admissions policies in any category.
We also asked for any available information regarding the reliability of
American data about these matters in Canadian educational contexts.
Our 1997 survey produced responses from all sixteen faculties,
but little new information. Thirteen faculties reported that they had not
conducted any empirical studies or reviewed the efficacy of their
admissions criteria and policies in any systematic way. A few expressed
an interest in conducting such research but had not done so. The chair of
one faculty admissions committee reported that studies had been done,
but that they could not be located.29 Mysteriously, two faculties indicated
that some sort of review of admissions policies was underway or recently
completed, but declined to share their information with us. Some of our
correspondents felt that the usefulness of admissions policies based on
combined UGPA/LSAT scores was proved by the low failure rates at
Canadian law faculties. One law school reported its not-unreasonable
assumption that correlation studies were commonly conducted at
Canadian law faculties and that these studies must have validated
existing admissions criteria. Finally, some correspondents indicated that
their own admittedly unsystematic observation and anecdotal evidence
confirmed the appropriateness of current admissions criteria.
Many faculties reported their reliance on “correlation studies”
conducted by the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC). These studies
attempt to assess the relative accuracy of a student’s LSAT score, UGPA,
and combined LSAT/UGPA  in predicting performance in first-year law.
Several Canadian law school deans indicated their confidence in the
LSAC studies and their belief that, the question having been addressed
29 The chair of the admissions committee for this faculty reported: “This Faculty has had
studies done in ‘effectiveness’ but they have not been done on a regular or a frequent basis. I believe
that we searched for them in the files … and came up empty. That says something about our record
keeping, but not our interest in the issue.”
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elsewhere, there is no need for individual faculties to independently
assess admissions policies.
There are indeed good reasons to trust LSAC’s studies.
Professionally prepared and statistically sophisticated, no Canadian law
faculty could possibly match the resources of LSAC. The efficiencies of
scale enjoyed by this major American institution are considerable. The
law deans’ confidence in LSAC and its researchers is well founded. We
are, however, less complacent than the deans in one crucial respect.
LSAC’s work does not purport to address all of the questions Canadian
law schools should want to resolve as they think about their admissions
processes.
There is a danger of confusing the rigorous social science
methods that underlie LSAC’s studies with “hard” science. The restricted
range and limited focus of LSAC’s inquiries is not generally appreciated
within the Canadian legal community.30 Nor are the implications that
30 LSAC’s own cautions in this regard are insufficiently heeded: see Law School Admission
Council, The 1998-1999 LSAT Registration and Information Book Canadian Edition (Newtown, Pa.:
Law School Admission Council, 1998) at 145, where the council states that:
The LSAT, like any admission test, is not a perfect predictor of law school performance.
The predictive power of an admission test is ultimately limited by many factors, such as
the complexity of the skills the test is designed to measure, the imperfections in the
variable the test tries to predict (i.e., law schools using different measures to assess law
school performance), and the unmeasurable factors that can affect students’
performances (i.e., motivation, physical and mental health, or work and family
responsibilities).
LSAC further advises, at 145, that
a test score should be regarded as a useful but approximate measure of a test taker's
abilities as measured by the test, not as an exact determination of his or her standing.
LSAC encourages law schools to examine the range of scores within the interval that
probably contains the test taker’s true score (e.g., the test taker’s score band) rather than
solely interpret the reported score alone.
A further advisory to law schools appears under the heading “Advice to Law Schools on Use of LSAT
Scores.” LSAC advises, at 146, that “[w]hile LSAT scores serve a useful purpose in the admission
process, they do not measure, nor are they intended to measure, all the elements important to
success at individual institutions. LSAT scores must be examined in relation to the total range of
information available about a prospective law student.” In this context LSAT offers several guidelines
to law schools for using LSAT scores. Some of the guidelines include: “Do not use the LSAT score as a
sole criterion for admission. Those who set admission policies and criteria should always keep in
mind the fact that the LSAT does not measure every discipline-related skill necessary for academic
work, nor does it measure other factors important to academic success”: ibid. Another LSAC
guideline states: “Do not use LSAT scores without an understanding of the limitations of such tests.
Admission officers and members of admission committees should be knowledgeable about tests and
test data and should recognize test limitations”: ibid. Deans of law schools have also criticized the
use of LSAT scores in admissions decisions. In P.J. Liacouras, Toward a Fair and Sensible Policy for
Professional School Admission (Denver: Education Commission of the States, 1978) the author, the
former dean of Temple Law School, argued that the LSAT failed to measure or identify
characteristics such as “common sense, self-discipline, motivation, judgement, practicality, idealism,
tenacity, fidelity, character and maturity, integrity, patience, preparation, the ability to listen,
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flow from the assumptions on which LSAC’s research rests. Moreover, no
Canadian law faculty has yet given serious consideration to the
possibility that Canada’s unique social, cultural, geographical, and
educational environments might render large-scale aggregate “National”
correlation studies (conducted almost exclusively on the basis of
American data) less than fully reliable.
In short, it exaggerates only slightly to say that the faculties that
offer a post-graduate degree, serving as the exclusive gateway to one of
Canada’s most influential, wealthy, and powerful professions, have been
content to employ admissions policies untested by any systematic,
rigorous assessment whatsoever. Two “common sense” beliefs—that
conventional admissions procedures must be good (otherwise they would
not exist) and that American studies provide reasonable guidance for
Canada—are the motor driving law school admissions. The result is that
admissions policies in the regular category rest on a witches’ brew of
memory, anecdote, and dimly recalled old reports that may or may not
have been rigorously conducted. Browning’s study at the University of
Manitoba, the most thorough to date, was completed in 1977—when
very different pedagogical, demographic, economic, professional, and
cultural environments prevailed.31
V.  REVIEW OF MAJOR STUDIES
Given the strong reliance placed on LSAC correlation studies, we
asked Canadian law schools for permission to review any studies of their
own admissions policies conducted by LSAC on their behalf during the
last five years. Ten common law schools reported that they had
commissioned LSAC correlation studies. Several provided us with
copies.32
perseverance, client-handling skills, creativity, courage, personality, oral skills, organizational ability
and leadership”: ibid. at 19. He proposed a more “humanistic” approach to admissions that moved
away from numbers-oriented indices.
31 Some of the transformations in Canadian legal education during the past two decades are
traced out in Transitions in the Ontario Legal Profession, supra note 3; and in F.M. Kay, N. Dautovich
& C. Marlor, Barriers and Opportunities Within Law: Women in a Changing Legal Profession
(Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 1996). Some of these transformations in Canadian legal
education were indicated or anticipated in Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law,
Law and Learning (Ottawa: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1983)
[hereinafter Law and Learning]. See also “Lawyering in Canada,” supra note 4; and “Canadian Legal
Education,” supra note 4.
32 Five faculties reported that they had not commissioned any such LSAC studies during the
preceding five-year period. One law school did not confirm whether or not such studies had been
commissioned on its behalf.
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LSAC also provided us with their own studies of aggregate data.
One report provides a three-year summary of LSAT correlation studies of
American law schools with a few Canadian schools folded into the mix.33
The tremendous reliance placed on LSAC’s “National” (a misnomer)
correlations render these documents, without a doubt, the most
important policy documents affecting Canadian legal education today.
Few law teachers or administrators, however, are intimately familiar with
these studies. Most have probably never seen an LSAC correlation study,
only a tiny handful will ever have read one, and few will have given
serious consideration to anything beyond the raw “correlation” figures
produced as an end-product. The method and assumptions underlying
LSAC’s correlation studies bear emphasis. Important policy issues lay
obscured between LSAC’s stated assumptions, our common
understandings with respect to statistical method, and the raw
correlations upon which faculties in fact rely.
LSAC’s most recent National Summary Report summarizes LSAT
correlation studies conducted in 1990, 1991, and 1992 at 162 law
schools.34 Most, but not all, of the law schools built into this study were
in the United States (the absolute interchangeability of Canada and the
United States is, seemingly, simply assumed). LSAC’s correlation studies
aim to assess the extent to which LSAT scores and UGPA are useful in
predicting success in the first year of law school (first-year “success” is
itself understood exclusively in terms of grade performance). A linear
regression analysis is employed to assess the degree of correlation.35
Two key findings emerge. First, reliance on combined UGPA and LSAT
provides a predictor that is “superior” to either alone. Moreover, “the
average multiple correlation between first-year grades in law school and
the combined predictors of LSAT and UGPA of .49 is higher than has ever
been reported previously.” Second, the report confirms that LSAT scores
taken alone are a better predictor of first-year average than UGPA
33 See L.F. Wightman, Predictive Validity of the LSAT: A National Summary of the 1990-1992
Correlation Studies (Newtown, Pa: Law School Admission Council, 1993) at 23 [hereinafter
Predictive Validity of the LSAT]. A more recent National Summary Report summarizing LSAT
correlation studies for the 1995-1996 year was published in August 1999 after this article had been
accepted for publication. It is much to the same effect as the previous “National” Correlation
studies and its findings do not affect the arguments made in this article.
34 The statistical meaning of “correlation” is precise and limited: “correlation measures the
linear relationship between two variables. It ranges from 1 for a perfect positive relationship to -1
for a perfect negative correlation”: Law School Admission Council, LSAT Correlation Study Report,
Summary of Results at 12 .
35 The regression analysis “employs [first-year average] as the criterion variable, LSAT and
UGPA as the predictor variables”: ibid. at 17.
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alone.36 Its major conclusion is that the LSAT remains as valid a predictor
of first-year performance as it was shown to be in a major study
conducted in 1982, and that the relative importance of LSAT and UGPA is
unchanged since that time.37
In all its self-studies, methodological overviews, and public
information, LSAC is quite clear that the admissions test it administers is
itself tested almost exclusively by reference to academic success (a
narrower criterion than professional success). This, in turn, is measured
solely by performance in first-year law (a narrower criterion than
academic success). LSAC asserts neither that first-year teaching practices
are particularly good, nor that first-year performance is a strong
indicator of good lawyering abilities. Rather, its exclusive reliance on this
seemingly unusual criterion is justified on pragmatic grounds. LSAC
presumes that first-year curriculum is substantially the same for all
students and across all law faculties and that establishing correlations
exclusively with first-year performance provides a partial control for
differences in course difficulty and grading stringency. Moreover, a
certain efficiency attaches to seeking correlations with first-year data,
rather than waiting for second- or third-year averages to become
available.
The one major Canadian study examining the effectiveness of
law school admissions criteria is that conducted by Barry Browning in
1977 (the “Manitoba study”).38 Following the pattern set in the United
States, Browning’s primary point of reference in evaluating effectiveness
of admissions criteria was first-year averages. His methodologically
sophisticated and far-reaching study used data available at the
University of Manitoba to investigate the relative utility of existing and
conceivable law school admissions criteria. It concluded that Canadian
UGPAs provide a “solid indicator of law school success.”39 Significantly,
Browning found that the correlation value between LSAT and first-year
36 The national summary data reveals that the “median validity for LSAT alone is .41,
compared with .26 for UGPA alone”: Predictive Validity of the LSAT, supra note 33 at 23.
37 Ibid. at 24.
38 See B. Browning, “A Walk Through the Black Forest or a Study of Criteria Effectively
Available for the Selection of Students to Faculties of Law” in R.J. Matas & D.J. McCawley, eds.,
Legal Education in Canada: Reports and Background Papers of a National Conference on Legal
Education (Montreal: Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 1987) 608.
39 Ibid. at 615.
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performance in Manitoba ranged between .26 and .47.40 His examination
of data taken from student files over an unspecified period revealed that
an “index score” combining UGPA and LSAT provided a more reliable
predictor than either UGPA or LSAT alone. The index score was the
strongest predictor of any tested for, with a statistical accuracy of 83 per
cent for all students (86 per cent in the “regular” category) in predicting
grade performance, albeit within wide grade-spread parameters.
The Manitoba study is especially valuable because it sought out
correlations not only with the routine criteria of law school admissions,
but also with a number of “social” or “biographical” traits that might
plausibly impact on a student’s performance. Correlations were run with
age, sex, work experience, university attended, faculty of pre-law studies,
length of education, highest degree held, major/minor fields of study,
and high school averages. Assessed separately, none of these factors
matched either the strong predictive values of an UGPA/LSAT index score,
or even that of UGPA or LSAT considered separately. When they were
appropriately incorporated into a multiple regression analysis such traits
increased predictive accuracy by approximately 1 per cent. Browning
considered this improvement “minimal”41 and not worth the cost that
would be involved if reference to such factors were routinely built into
the admissions process. Only high school average proved to be a strong
predictor of first-year success, ranking after UGPA and LSAT in predictive
utility.42 Unfortunately, the precise correlation between high school
average and first-year average was not reported.
Although Browning failed to find useful positive correlations in
“biographical” criteria, he identified some negative ones. Though not
reported in this way, Browning’s findings in this respect might be
construed as a telling indictment of adult education in Canadian law
faculties: negative correlations were found with age, work experience,
40 The American comparison is interesting in that the Manitoba results over the period of
Browning’s study cover a range of correlations that spans the highest and lowest quartiles of
American law schools. In W.B. Schrader, Summary of Law School Validity Studies, 1948-1975
(Newtown, Pa: Law School Admission Council, 1977) at 530, Schrader reports LSAT/first-year
average correlations in 1971-1974 (a period mid-point in the Manitoba study) of .44 in the 75th
percentile and .29 in the 25th percentile. See, for example, F.R. Evans, Recent Trends in Law School
Validity Studies (Newtown, Pa: Law School Admission Council, 1982).
41 Browning, supra note 38 at 620.
42 According to Browning, gender and pre-law university attended showed no statistical
difference in first-year performance. Furthermore, faculty of pre-law studies showed no significant
statistical difference in first-year performance. Browning excluded consideration of correlations
with major/minor fields of study because there was an insufficient sample size. Class rank was found
to be a useful device to resolve differences arising from divergent grading practices in different
departments and universities.
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length of education (unbroken length of studies), and highest degree
held. Crudely, older students did less well than younger ones, students
who applied “with the minimum academic qualifications required seem
to perform the best.”43 These troubling findings imply that the most
immature, least educated, least experienced students do best at law
school even though—one presumes—they are least able to assume the
responsibilities of a lawyer.
Finally, the Manitoba study concluded that letters of reference,
interviews, and the like cannot be reliably built into law school
admissions processes because there are no effective controls for
interviewer bias or dishonesty by referees or candidates.44
Browning understood his findings to be tentative and urged
further research to build on it. Unfortunately, his plea has gone
unanswered. Recent writings on legal education have not included any
formal follow-up to his twenty-year-old study.45 This is doubly
43 Browning, supra note 38 at 620, 623.
44 Browning’s account of cases in which, for example, a man wrote a reference letter for his
own daughter, and a female interviewer believed only male candidates were suitable for medical
school, serves as a useful reminder of the problems potentially associated with “subjective”
admissions criteria. One of the authors of this article knows of a case in which a law school hopeful
established a “charity” in order to make himself the chief executive officer only in the hope of
impressing law school admissions officials with his managerial abilities and social conscience! More
subtly, psychological and business literature points to a variety of ways in which predictable human
biases intrude on “subjective” appraisals of individual merit, reminding us of the need for caution in
re-designing admissions policies: see, for example, N. Foster et al., “Gender in Mock Hiring
Decisions” (1996) 79 Psychol. Rep. 275 (revealing strong gender bias by both male and female
interviewers in favour of their own gender); K.M. Neckerman & J. Kirschenman, “Hiring Strategies,
Racial Bias, and Inner-City Workers” (1991) 38 Soc. Probs. 433 (revealing race and class biases in
recruitment strategies and employment interviews including a finding, at 435, that race was
“significantly associated with interviewer ratings of nonverbal cues such as facial expression,
posture, and certain aspects of voice that are known to influence employers”); and A.J. Kinicki &
C.A. Lockwood, “The Interview Process: An Examination of Factors Recruiters Use in Evaluating
Job Applicants” (1985) 26 Vocational Behav. 117 at 123-25 (reporting employers’ heavy reliance on
“subjective and impressionistic” factors rather than “objective and concrete” information in making
hiring decisions). For a useful summary of research in this area, see S.J. Cesare, “Subjective
Judgment and the Selection Interview: A Methodological Review” (1996) 25 Pub. Personnel Mgmt.
291.
45 See T. Alvi et al., “Equality in Legal Education: Sharing a Vision, Creating the Pathways”
(1992) 17 Queen’s L.J. 174; Blonde et al., supra note 16; J.E.C. Brierley “Legal Education in
Canada” (1993) 72 Or. L. Rev. 977; B. Feldthusen, “Affirmative Action: Taking Equality Seriously”
(1988) 8 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 292; H. MacAulay, “Improving Access to Legal Education for
Native People in Canada: Dalhousie Law School’s I.B.M. Program in Context” (1991) 14 Dal. L.J.
133; R.J. Matas & D.J. McCawley, eds., Legal Education in Canada (Montreal: Federation of Law
Societies of Canada, 1987); B.M. Mazer, “Access to Legal Education and the Profession in Canada”
in R. Dhavan, N. Kibble & W. Twining, eds., Access to Legal Education and the Legal Profession
(London: Butterworths, 1989) 114; P.A. Monture, “Now that the Door is Open: First Nations and
the Law School Experience” (1990) 15 Queen’s L.J. 179; W.W. Pue, Law School: The Story of Legal
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unfortunate, for the passage of time matters immensely here. The
conclusions of a study that relied on data generated in the 1970s cannot
be assumed to apply to the very different law school environments at the
beginning of the century. Changes in curriculum, teaching methods, and
student demographics, combined with profound transformations in both
the legal profession and the Canadian economy over the past quarter
century might all reasonably be expected to impact significantly on both
the pool of law-school applicants46 and the nature of their educational
experience once they get there.47
Education in British Columbia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Faculty of Law, 1995);
and D.J. Purich, “Affirmative Action in Canadian Law Schools: The Native Student in Law School”
(1986) 51 Sask. L. Rev. 79.
46 See, for example, Law and Learning, supra note 31; and H.W. Arthurs & R. Kreklewich,
“Law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in the New Economy” (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 1. For a discussion on changing demographics in law school and the profession, see Alvi et al.,
supra note 45; Challenge of Racial Equality, supra note 9; Virtual Justice, supra note 9, Abel & Lewis,
eds., supra note 3; R.L. Abel, American Lawyers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989);
Brockman & Chunn, eds., supra note 3; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3; and Hagan & Kay, supra
note 3. According to Touchstones for Change, supra note 3 at 2, “women comprise over 25% of all
faculty in Canadian law schools.” However, the report notes that minority men and women are still
under-represented, and few women can rely on the same opportunity for advancement as their male
counterparts. The participation of women in legal education has changed markedly since the 1970s.
According to Blonde et al., supra note 16 at 542, at the University of Windsor Law School, for
example, the male/female student ratio has moved from three-to-one (in favour of male students) to
an approximate one-to-one balance in recent years. At the University of British Columbia Faculty of
Law, during a similar period, the proportion of women students grew from 4 per cent (1970) to 29
per cent (1980), 47 per cent (1990), and 43 per cent (1997): see “Ratio of Male: Female Grads” The
Gryphon (October 1998) 11. See also Stager & Arthurs, supra note 5 at 96-97, which indicates full-
time enrollment in LL.B. programs in Canada, by province, from 1920-1988. Table 4.3 at 96 reveals
that the proportion of women who attended Canadian law schools during this time increased
steadily, reaching 48.3 per cent in 1988.
47 There has been surprisingly little research addressing the relationship between the changing
composition of law faculty student bodies and either the method of teaching or the curriculum
components that would be most helpful to them. What little research there is has tended to focus on
student needs in relation to the “Legal Research and Writing” programs that have proliferated in
North America during the past two or three decades. See, for example, E.B. Cohen, “Teaching
Legal Research to a Diverse Student Body” (1993) 85 L. Libr. J. 583 (arguing, at 583, that the
increasing diversity of law students requires a broadening of teaching methods to meet a wider
variety of learning styles, especially to take accounts of the peculiar needs of “minority men and
women, Euro-American women, and older returning students.” Cohen bemoans, at 585, a situation
in which
few articles … discuss improving teaching methods by incorporating an understanding of
the different learning styles of students … . No article addresses differences in learning
styles of students in the increasingly diverse student population as a method of improving
the teaching of legal research. Yet, the composition of the law student population
nationally has changed.
See also D.W. Champagne, “Improving Your Teaching: How Do Students Learn?” (1991) 83 L.
Libr. J. 85. In an article valuable for both its empirical foundation and its focus on law school
pedagogy, M.F. Fitzgerald, “What’s Wrong with Legal Research and Writing? Problems and
Solutions” (1996) 88 L. Libr. J. 247, draws attention to several pervasive problems in Canadian legal
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Moreover, there are in fact significant variations in curricula
from one faculty to another. It is not unthinkable that admissions criteria
proven effective at a small law school such as Manitoba’s might be
entirely unsuited to larger faculties offering more diverse course
offerings and more expansive intellectual agendas. We simply do not
know. It is possible too that computer technologies and applications
developed during the past two decades might permit a much more full
and complete search for “social” or “biographical” correlations, positive
or negative, than was possible in the 1970s. Again, we do not know.
No such work has been done (we leave aside the Windsor study48
that focused on a law faculty whose admissions policies lay outside of the
Canadian mainstream). In an effort to update Browning’s findings we
reviewed the results of as many LSAC correlation studies of individual
Canadian law faculties as we were able to obtain. Of Canada’s sixteen
common law faculties, five had not commissioned LSAC correlation
studies, one would not reveal whether it had or not, and four refused to
share their data with us.49 Table 1, below, summarizes the six sets of
correlation studies available to us.
These correlation analyses are inconclusive even with respect to
the narrow issue of assessing the relative utility of UGPA and LSAT in
predicting first-year grade performance. In some cases, the correlations
are astonishingly weak; others provide modest evidence corroborating
Browning’s conclusions. These figures suggest that Canadian UGPAs may
be a somewhat better indicator of success in first-year law than seems to
be the case in the United States, where, of course, the LSAT is developed
and managed specifically to solve the problem of widely varying
standards of undergraduate education. It needs to be recalled in this
context too that even a “strong” correlation of .50 would mean that only
50 per cent of the variation is explicable by reference to the predictor
variable assessed.
education. Her work, derived from a questionnaire sent to fifteen Canadian law schools in 1993,
describes the typical law school curriculum as a “dinosaur” severely out of step with the changing
needs of the profession and students. She argues that law teachers fail to appreciate theories about
teaching and learning (such as basic learning theory, adult education theory, skills theory, problem-
based approaches, and self-learning approaches), that assessment methods fail to test skills students
have been taught, and that the case method prevails out of convention rather than demonstrated
pedagogical utility.
48 See Blonde et al., supra note 16.
49 It should be observed that the heightened sense of insecurity and fear that pervades
Canadian legal education at this time has produced an almost paranoid concern that any
information about individual faculties might be construed negatively, might hurt their place in
“national rankings,” and hence, might damage institutions irreparably.
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TABLE 1
LAW SCHOOL LSAT & FYA UGPA & FYA UGPA & LSAT
LAW  SCHOOL A
Study 1 – Full-time only,
Regular Admission
0.212 0.256 -0.057
Study 2 – Full-time only,
Special Admission
0.491 0.139 -0.02
Study 3 – Full-time students
only
0.572 0.478 0.409
Study 4 – Full-time only,
Regular and Special
Admission
0.444 0.387 0.262
LAW SCHOOL B
Full-time only 0.306 0.316 0.220
LAW SCHOOL C
Full-time only 0.513 0.378 0.202
LAW SCHOOL D
Study 1 – Full-time only 0.467 0.367 0.263
Study 2 – Full-time only 0.465 0.395 0.209
LAW SCHOOL E
Full-time only 0.253 0.184 -0.193
LAW SCHOOL F
Study 1 – Full-time only,
Regular Admission
0.169 0.121 -0.494
Study 2 – Full-time only,
Regular Admission
0.154 0.211 -0.432
FYA = First Year Average (average in first year of law school)
UGPA = Undergraduate Grade Point Average
LSAT = Law School Admissions Test Score
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Moreover, a strong correlation may not be a good thing. What
are we to make of law school F’s extremely low correlations, for
example? A very weak correlation might indicate a school with either
very poor admissions policies (unable to detect talent) or very good ones
(identifying good students whose index scores are not an accurate
measure of their ability). It might indicate either terrible teaching and
examination methods (where good students do not attain their potential)
or outstanding teaching (where low index-score students are helped to
achieve their full potential). Correlation scores tell us remarkably little
about either average student ability or quality of education.
VI.  SOME PROBLEMS WITH LSAT/UGPA
AND CORRELATION STUDIES
Where, then, does all this leave us? First, it is reasonably clear
that we know far less than we should about the efficacy of Canadian law
faculties’ admissions policies. There are hints—but in truth no more
than that—that admissions criteria derived from American social and
educational experience may not be fully applicable in Canada. Canadian
evidence pointing towards a meaningful correlation between LSAT or
index scores and law school performance is much weaker than one might
have expected. But then, there is less evidence of any sort in this field
than one would hope for.
There are, in our view, some fundamental problems associated
with reliance (particularly unthinking reliance) on LSAT and LSAT-based
index scores as a basis for law school admissions that have little to do
with the validity of available correlation studies.
A.  Late Bloomers
The most fundamental objection, perhaps, relates not to the
failure of method in existing correlation studies, but rather to their
limited ambition. It bears re-emphasis that the only correlations sought
by LSAC or Browning were between existing or possible admissions
criteria and performance in the first year of law school. Focus on this
particular correlation rather than other possible indicators of academic
or professional success (upper-year performance, cumulative law school
GPA, mooting success, prizes won, professional income, appointments, or
honours, amongst others, come to mind) has become the routine method
of assessing law school admissions policies.
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It is, however, inappropriate for legal educators to permit LSAC’s
exclusive focus on first-year performance to steer educational policy.50
First, admissions policies developed exclusively with reference to first-
year success cannot take account of “late bloomers.” The first year of
law school requires adjustment to a peculiar academic culture (e.g.,
teaching style, evaluation methods, and “case law” method of thinking)
and to the law school’s social environment (e.g., “fitting in,” proto-
professional ethos, intensity of student interactions, density and
narrowness of culture). For many students—especially, perhaps, those
from non-traditional backgrounds—intellectual ability and professional
skills may not be accurately reflected in their first, “settling in,” year. In
fact, legal education may be experienced as “culture shock.” Law schools
remain, for the most part, homogeneous environments in terms of
student and faculty social class, race, ethnicity, age, and so forth.51 In the
result, if the LSAT score accurately predicts first-year performance, this
may be merely an indication that it accurately tests the ability of
individuals to take a test that is, after all, rather similar to law school 100
per cent final examinations. It is altogether possible that persons from
disadvantaged backgrounds are statistically more likely to do poorly on
the LSAT and need more time to adjust to law school than those from
relatively advantaged backgrounds.52 Neither necessarily indicates
intellectual incompetence, lack of legal skills, or future inability to serve
well as a lawyer. LSAC’s reliance on first-year performance simply does
not speak to students’ suitability for the profession. It should be a cause
for general concern that those persons from non-traditional or
50 For the sake of clarity, we wish to emphasize that the following comments are not offered as
a criticism of LSAC and its studies, but rather as a caution that they need to be read—as they are
written—carefully and with an eye to the consequences flowing from the methodology pursued. As
discussed in note 30, supra, LSAC is careful and quite clear in stating its assumptions regarding the
utility of reliance on first-year averages in its correlation studies. Educators must, however, beware
of mistaking methodological assumption for pedagogical edict.
51 See Aboriginal Law Graduates Focus Groups, supra note 9; Report on the Survey of Aboriginal
Law Graduates in British Columbia, supra note 9; Survey of Black Law Students, supra note 9; Alvi et
al., supra note 45; and Monture, supra note 45.
52 See  Challenge of Racial Equality, supra note 9; Virtual Justice, supra note 9; Dhavan, Kibble
&  Twining, eds., supra note 45; J.C. Hathaway, “The Mythical Meritocracy of Law School
Admissions” (1984) 34 Legal Educ. 86; B. Powell & L. Carr Steelman, “Equity and the LSAT”
(1983) 53 Harv. Educ. Rev. 32; D.M. White, ed., Towards a Diversified Legal Profession: An Inquiry
into the Law School Admission Test, Grade Inflation, and Current Admissions Policies (New York:
National Conference of Black Lawyers, 1981); W.V. Slack & D. Porter, “Training, Validity and the
Issue of Aptitude: A Reply to Jackson” (1980) 50 Harv. Educ. Rev. 392; and M.J. Moorhead, “The
Impact on Minorities of the Legal Professionalization Process: An Overview” (1979) 22 Howard
L.J. 463.
1999] The Best and the Brightest? 867
disadvantaged backgrounds may be disproportionately “cut out” by
admissions policies that are geared towards such a narrow focus.
B.  Uninspired Pedagogy
Students who are pre-adapted to immediate success in programs
as currently constructed are, of course, exactly what educational
institutions (and, let it be admitted, the teachers who staff them) want.
Undemanding and largely self-educating, such students are a delight to
teach. Admissions policies that serve teachers’ convenience so well
relieve us of responsibility to think more creatively about such matters as
curriculum, pedagogy, and modes of course delivery.
Law faculties are notoriously bad at providing “transition”
courses, for example. Vernellia Randall, disturbingly, has offered the
global assessment of legal education as “incompetent education.”53 Her
views present a searing indictment of prevalent educational practices in
North American law faculties. The “one-size-fits-all approach to student
learning,” she says, “has historically disadvantaged non-traditional
groups.”54 Noting that “we admit a student population that is diverse in
its learning styles,” Randall argues that legal educators “have an ethical,
if not a legal, responsibility to those students right now to today provide
them with a pedagogically-sound legal education … .”55 This is not the
proper place for an extended discussion of the merits or failings of
contemporary approaches to legal education. Certainly, we would not
wish to be understood as denying the extraordinary effectiveness, rigour,
and excitement about learning conveyed—to some students, at least—by
Socratic method and case-based legal education. Nonetheless, Randall’s
listing of the pedagogical shortcomings of traditional law school method
is telling:
• we teach using one dominant method without regard to its
educational effectiveness;
• we do not clearly communicate student-centred learning
objectives; that is, we do not tell students what it is they need to
know or what they need to be able to do to perform adequately;
53 See V.R. Randall, “Legal Education: Incompetent Education?” online: Students, Learning
and Legal Education <http://www.udayton.edu/~aep/> (date accessed: 26 February 2000).
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
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• we teach basic legal analytical skills in extremely large
classrooms (an oxymoron at best);
• we teach one set of skills (oral analytical skills) and we test
another (written analytical skills);
• we provide little opportunity for students to practice the skills we
do teach (oral analytical skills);
• we provide no opportunity for students to practice the skills we
test (written analytical skills);
• we evaluate students based on only one or two exams a semester;
• we evaluate students using a method (essay exams) that has been
documented to lack reliability and validity;
• we assign grades not based on actual criterion-referenced
performance (learning objectives), but on norm-referenced
performance (performance compared to other students);
• we know little about pedagogy, learning theory, or evaluation
and seem singularly reluctant to learn; and
• we do little to help our students to understand how they learn
and how to maximize their learning in law school.56
Now, not every law school, much less every law teacher is guilty
of all of these “sins.” It is possible that American legal education is more
deficient in these respects than Canadian legal education or that Randall
caricatures, to some extent, legal education in the United States.
Nonetheless, this bare-bones listings of pedagogical failure is
uncomfortably familiar to Canadian law teachers. We all see our own
image, however imperfectly, in the mirror Randall holds up.
LSAC’s correlations give the patina of legitimacy to current
educational practices, letting law schools “off the hook” with regard to
pedagogical developments that could improve the quality of teaching
across the board. Adopting admissions policies that are in effect
designed to confirm our late nineteenth-century teaching practices is
convenient for law teachers and suspect as educational policy. Where are
the courses modelled on “College 101,” aimed at helping students to
negotiate the transition to a new educational environment?57 First-year
56 Ibid.
57 The “Freshman Seminar” or “College 101” courses offered in many American colleges and
universities is one example of a program that focuses on the “Freshman Year Experience” from the
point of view of the student. Acknowledging that a student’s freshman year is often a difficult time
of transition and adjustment (like first-year law school), “College 101” courses aim to ease the
transition by teaching necessary skills and explicitly addressing important topics of concern to first-
year students (including academic performance, faculty and student interaction, friendship and
romance, community, conflict, family ties, personal identity, and spirituality). For further discussion,
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law school, shot-through with hype, massive amounts of reading, large
classes, strange vocabularies, an absence of individual tutoring or
mentoring, and 100 per cent final exams, can be an intimidating and
alienating experience. “Transition” courses would help to make first year
less psychologically overwhelming and stressful, a point underlined by
University of Windsor alumnae who suggested that the “Law School
should provide a special tutoring component to enable natives and
poorer minority females to complete legal education.”58 This is not
simply a “minority” issue, however. The issues relating to introductory
curriculum go far beyond modifying a “methods” course, offering
remedial education to selected students, or introducing a general course
in the character of “Law School 101.”
C.  Evaluation Procedures
Teaching and evaluation procedures may need re-evaluation.
Like the curriculum itself, our current practices in these respects would
be immediately recognizable by our nineteenth-century forebears.
Complacency about LSAT correlations allows us to rest in a convenient
rut, explaining any deviation as a sop to the unwashed who, in a surfeit
of middle-class guilt, we admit but do not fully accept. Some law schools
have revamped their evaluation processes. Yale, for example, uses a
credit/fail grading scheme for all first-term required courses.59 Law
schools will need to re-examine and redefine grading standards for first
year if they are found to be discriminatory on class, race, ethnicity,
region, or gender grounds. Similarly, student promotion standards may
need to be modified. A thoughtful reaction to LSAT/UGPA correlation
studies may require actual educational reform, not just further tinkering
with the weighting formula applied to “objective” admissions criteria.
The objective of any such changes should be not to dilute standards, but
to improve education for all students and to attain net gains in the
quality of law graduates.
see J.D. Lawry, College 101: A First-Year Reader (Boston: McGraw-Hill College, 1999); R.T. Farrar,
College 101: Making the Most of Your Freshman Year (Princeton: Peterson’s Guides, 1988); and B.
Stuart & K. Stuart, College 101 (New York: Macmillan, 1993).
58 Blonde et al., supra note 16 at 545.
59 At Yale Law School, the first-year courses are constitutional law, contracts, procedure, and
torts. The Faculty’s web site states that “for the first term, all grades are credit/fail. After that,
grades are honors, pass, low pass, fail, with credit/fail option”: online: Yale Law School
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/lawschool/admissions/> (date accessed: 26 April 2000).
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D.  What Do Lawyers Do?
First-year performance may not be the most accurate test of
professional abilities. It would be an odd legal practice that approached
professional services in the way first-year law implies—oriented
exclusively to appellate litigation, restricted to common law fields
entirely unsullied by statute, employing doctrinal analysis and
examinable knowledge as the key work skills, with little use for deep
thought, sharp human perception, sound judgement, or writing ability!
Not surprisingly, many practitioners look back on first-year law (or even
all three years of law school) as “irrelevant” to their day-to-day practice
and often criticize their legal education for failing to adequately prepare
them for their professional work. All told, continued reliance on first-
year law average as the sole indicator of academic success and as a
predictor of future professional success seems absurd.
E.  Apples and Oranges?
We should pause to consider LSAC’s stated reason for its
exclusive reliance on the first-year average: the assumption that “the
first-year grade point average tends to represent basically the same
curriculum for all of the students in the school.”60 We question this
assumption. It presumes that the first-year curriculum—and, by
implication, the teaching method and examination method—are uniform
not only within a law faculty but also from school to school, and between
the United States and Canada (the statement appears in the most recent
“national” correlation summary). This seems highly suspect given faculty
diversity, regional differences within the United States, and the many
social, cultural, political, and legal differences between the United States
and Canada, which influence subject matter, approaches to teaching,
and instructional method in the first-year law curriculum. To use a well
worn phrase much loved by lawyers, LSAC’s methods may seek “national”
correlations by trying to compare “apples and oranges.”
It might be more useful for LSAC to define academic success by
reference to student averages in the upper years, or the overall three
years of law school. The study conducted by the University of Windsor
hints that such an approach might be useful. Windsor’s study revealed
that “six per cent of the beneficiaries of the broader-based admission
60 Predictive Validity of the LSAT, supra note 33 at 3.
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policy … rank among the top ten per cent of graduates … .”61 There
have been few follow-up studies on other groups (even Wightman62
examined only success in bar admission examinations) and there is
consequently little evidence of any sort that high LSAT scores correlate
with post-graduation success by any criteria.
F.  Whose Correlations?
There are other questions to be raised about the LSAT correlation
studies beyond critiques of this sort. For example, LSAT correlation
studies offer no control group or other baseline of comparison. We know
something about a group of students all of whom have done well in LSAT
tests, but this, by definition, cannot tell us anything about applicants who
are never admitted to law school, much less about potentially able
individuals who do not apply. Even if very high correlations are shown, it
is one thing to say that there is a positive correlation with the existing
student population, and quite another to assert that there would be a
positive correlation if quite different criteria were deployed in the
admissions process. LSAC does try to answer this criticism by statistical
methods. For all its statistical rigour, however, the attempt amounts to
little more than tugging at one’s own bootstraps. There simply is no data
available to support the contention.
There is also no attempt in existing correlation studies to go
behind the raw data in an attempt to discern what LSAT/UGPA index
scores may themselves correlate with. It is possible that index scores are
only the most visible indicia of some deeper “causes” of success or
failure. Looking only to LSAT and UGPA as predictors obscures other
possible predictors that might have more predictive value. Place of
origin, class, parental background, region of origin, race, undergraduate
discipline, or undergraduate college all seem plausible candidates, for
example. LSAT and UGPA might be stand-ins for these or other ascriptive
61 Blonde et al., supra note 16 at 548.
62 See Predictive Validity of the LSAT, supra note 33.
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traits. We do not know because the research has not been done.63
Perhaps we do not want to know.
VII.  STANDARDIZED TESTING AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Tony Schwartz reported at length on an increasing trend for
well-heeled students to hire tutors in preparation for the Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT), an undergraduate admissions test similar in intent
to the LSAT.64 Arun Alagappan’s “Advantage Testing” (an academic
tutoring and test preparation company) charges US$175 for 50 minutes
with an Advantage Tutor in New York City. The average cost of working
with an Advantage tutor in preparation for the SAT was reported to be
between US$5,000 and $8,000.65 Expensive it may be, but impressive
claims are made with regard to the efficacy of quality tutoring in test-
taking skills. Alagappan claims that the mean gain for students he
personally “tutored in 1997 and 1998 was 266 points from the first time
they took an official P.S.A.T. or S.A.T. to the last.”66 Furthermore, he
asserts that fully “91 percent of the students who worked with any of the
New York City-based tutors at Advantage increased their scores by at
least 100 points.”67
Other tutoring companies are available on other cost formulae,
just as one would expect in a functioning market economy. New York’s
Stanford Coaching, for example, provides SAT tutoring for US$150–350
per hour, while Kaplan Educational Centres and the Princeton Review
offer six- to eight-week SAT preparation courses plus practice tests for
US $800. Although Educational Testing Services (which administers the
63 Two further points bear noting, though they do not speak directly to LSAC’s methods and
assumptions. First, the way in which LSAT scores are used by individual law schools frequently
ignores the explicit cautions LSAC offers about LSAT’s reliability: most admission and rejection
decisions take place within a range of LSAT or index scores that is so narrow as to be statistically
meaningless. Second, cynics might suggest there is a problem with the organization that creates the
LSAT being the only body that systematically evaluates its usefulness. Though we do not necessarily
share this view—LSAC’s studies are done with rigour and if their reports are read the qualifications
they offer are honest, direct, and clear—the problem of the “fox in the henhouse” or “poachers as
game officers” does raise some questions.
64 See T. Schwartz, “The Test Under Stress” New York Times Magazine (10 January 1999) 30.
65 The tutoring services of Mr. Alagappan himself cost considerably more. At $415
(approximately C$600) per session and with sessions once or twice a week over an academic year,
the total cost for one of his students could rise to approximately $25,000 (roughly C$37,500): ibid. at
30.
66 Ibid. at 31.
67 Ibid. at 31-32.
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SAT) denies the benefits of coaching, such services are not lacking for
customers: each company enrolls approximately 35,000 students a year.68
By these standards Canadian LSAT preparation courses are a
bargain: Canadian students can take a Kaplan LSAT preparation course
consisting of ten three-hour sessions over a five-week period for C$900.
Alternatively, law hopefuls can also arrange for an intensive thirty-hour
one-on-one tutoring program for C$2,700 or a fifteen-hour program for
C$1,600.69 Bargain-basement though they are by American standards,
these are significant expenditures for most aspiring law students. The
cost of one year of law school at the University of British Columbia, by
comparison, is currently slightly under C$3,000. Furthermore, the cost of
sitting an LSAT needs to be taken into account if the social costs and
benefits associated with admissions policies based on standardized
aptitude tests are to be evaluated. In Canada LSAC charges C$120 plus
Goods and Services Tax to write the test, more than small change for
most Canadians.
Now, if the law and economics movement of the past forty years
has taught us anything at all it is that we should consider the aggregate
(total) costs of any course of action independently of distribution (who
pays). The present system of law school admissions imposes de jure costs
on students (“externalities”) in the form of LSAT sitting fees and also
predictable de facto costs associated with the courses students may feel
compelled to take in preparation for this potentially life transforming
examination.
The huge costs of the LSAT system may be better understood if
some comparisons are considered. Other distributions of costs and
benefits would produce some quite dramatic results. Suppose, for
example, that a law school that averaged one thousand applicants
annually abolished reliance on standardized testing, implementing
instead a non-refundable application fee equivalent to the LSAT charges.
This alone would add an extra $120,000 to the faculty budget on an
annual basis. In real-world equivalents, this is, roughly, the salary of two
assistant professors, the cost of forty state-of-the-art student computers,
ten sizable scholarships, or four placement officers. If we assume that,
on average, every students pays an equivalent to Kaplan’s basic tutoring
package (some will opt for the more expensive individual tutoring; some
will “go it alone”) the costs associated with the use of LSAT are even
more striking. At C$900 (Kaplan’s charge) plus C$120 (LSAT’s charge)
68 Ibid. at 32.
69 Letter from Kaplan Education Centre to D. Tong (9 March 1999).
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this assumption would produce a total expenditure of C$1,200,000
annually—enough to pay for an army of twenty assistant professors,
1,000 not-so-bad computers, forty-eight C$25,000 scholarships, or forty
administrative and support staff.
Even if LSAT produces measurable improvement over other
admission strategies (a point that, all things considered, remains
unproved) we would wish to consider whether its aggregate cost is overly
high in relation to the marginal gain produced. There is no law faculty in
North America that could not improve the experience and quality of
education for all its students with an extra $100,000 to $1,000,000 in
hand. The burden of proof may have been left with critics of LSAT-based
admissions for far too long. In the absence of overwhelming proof of its
usefulness, the LSAT system may be wasting societal resources on a fairly
massive scale for no equivalent return.
The cost, moreover, is not only financial. It also creates
psychological barriers, in direct proportion to a potential law school
applicant’s sense of his or her own social distance from elite institutions.
Risk aversion, whether with respect to the psychological blow a low LSAT
score might represent or the $100 or $1,000 to be gambled in direct costs
associated with the law school admissions lottery, is not equally
distributed across society.
VIII.  CONCLUSION
In this article, we discussed several problems concerning LSAC
correlation studies. In particular we emphasized concerns regarding late-
bloomers, lack of transition courses to law school, re-examination of
teaching and evaluation procedures, implausible predictors of
professional abilities, and the varying first-year curricula at American
and Canadian law schools. We also identified an almost total lack of
Canadian research about these matters.
Although we believe that the thorough, tremendously rigorous
studies produced by the United States’ LSAC must not be accepted
uncritically in Canada’s different circumstances, this is not our major
concern. Rather, the methodological presumptions that underpin these
studies and the explicit limitations that arise from their focus and
method must be brought from the shadows to become the focal point of
informed discussions of law school admissions policies in Canada.
Canadian law schools must place greater priority on assessing
their admissions criteria, particularly in light of their stated goals of
equity and diversity. We can no longer assume that someone else has
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done the necessary research or that LSAC can give them easy, off-the-rack
answers to the hard questions law schools face in admissions decisions.
Those faculty members and staff who do look hard at their own
faculty’s admissions policies (there are a number of such individuals
across the country) need to make their research public, not only within
their own faculties, but also by sharing information among institutions
and by publishing the results of their findings in learned journals,
publicly available reports, and other media. As a matter of public
concern, basic principles of scholarly inquiry require that research
methods and findings be opened to assessment from outside. As
custodians of the gateway to law, trusted by legal professions, the courts,
and society at large to exercise a key discretion, we are bound by the
maxim delegatus non potest delegare—as law teachers we cannot properly
delegate our duties in this respect indefinitely to an outside agency.
Continued uncritical reliance on LSAT and on LSAC correlation studies
excuses law faculties from their duties to engage in thorough-going
evaluations of what we do and what our public duties are. Given that
only two law schools in Canada have ever conducted empirical studies to
determine the efficacy of their admission policies, it is time for Canadian
law schools to think seriously about admissions as they attempt to select
the “best and the brightest” for the twenty-first century.
In pointing to these concerns, we do not wish to imply that there
is any easy answer to the question “who should be admitted to law
school?” We recognize both the administrative and the egalitarian
appeal of “objective” criteria and we are aware of the dangers inherent
in any admissions policy based on “umpire’s discretion”—a notorious
form of lawlessness at best.70 Nor do we in any way suggest that the
objective should be anything other than ensuring the admission of
deserving individuals who have the ability and determination to succeed
both in their formal legal education and in their subsequent careers.
The task of identifying and training “the best and the brightest”
to serve Canada’s communities is an onerous and important public duty,
which imposes an enormous responsibility on Canadian law professors.
After thirty years, we are now in the habit of relying on a foreign I.Q.
70 The Windsor Law School study, for example, found that older, married students with
children did best because of the “responsibility and stability perceived to accompany a successful
marital relationship and the presence of children”: Blonde et al., supra note 16 at 542-43. If such
findings were to now find their way back into admissions criteria, it is by no means clear that the
result would be an improvement over “objective” criteria from the point of view either of increasing
diversity amongst the lawyerly population or of increasing upward social mobility for the talented
but disadvantaged. On the dangers of “umpire’s discretion,” see L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law
(New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1964).
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test to guard the portals of the Canadian legal profession. It is time to
re-evaluate our assumptions and our practices. We are morally bound to
do so.71
71 Standardized testing is in fact coming under increasing scrutiny in the United States. See,
for example, the trenchant critique provided in N. Lemann, The Big Test: The Secret History of the
American Meritocracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999). There has also been recent
litigation in both Canada and the United States concerning the use and implementation of the LSAT
by law schools: see, for example, “Graduate to Test Law School Admission Process in Court
Action” The National Post (14 October 1999) A6.
